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Frans	Timmermans’	subsidiarity	proposals	do	not	go
far	enough	to	address	the	EU’s	democratic	deficit
The	EU’s	principle	of	‘subsidiarity’	states	that	only	actions	which	cannot	be	effectively	achieved	at	the
national	level	and	can	be	better	achieved	at	the	EU	level	should	be	exercised	by	the	EU.	Davor	Jancic
assesses	the	report	published	on	10	July	2018	by	a	European	Commission	‘Taskforce	on	Subsidiarity,
Proportionality	and	Doing	Less	More	Efficiently’.	He	argues	that	the	proposals,	though	helpful,	do	not
go	far	enough	in	addressing	the	democratic	deficit	that	exists	in	the	integration	process.
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On	14	September	2017,	the	European	Commission	established	a	Taskforce	on	Subsidiarity,	Proportionality	and
Doing	Less	More	Efficiently	under	the	helm	of	its	First	Vice-President,	Frans	Timmermans.	But	the	proposals	made
by	the	Taskforce	during	its	work	(which	took	place	from	January	to	July	this	year)	are	thin	and	should	have	been	far
more	ambitious	in	order	to	inject	genuine	impetus	into	the	EU	democratic	reform	process.	Instead,	they	recommend
very	light	enhancements,	which	though	helpful,	do	not	target	the	core	of	the	democratic	deficit.
To	begin	with,	it	is	laudable	that	subsidiarity	has	received	attention	because	the	first	eight	years	of	the	early	warning
mechanism	have	exposed	its	limitations.	The	Taskforce	therefore	advocates	‘active	subsidiarity’.	This	is	based	on	a
common	subsidiarity	assessment	grid,	a	uniform	structured	questionnaire	to	be	used	by	EU	and	national	institutions
when	monitoring	whether	draft	EU	legislation	complies	with	subsidiarity.
This	proposal	certainly	contributes	to	increased	consistency	among	parliamentary	scrutiny	practices.	The
Commission	will	be	more	pressed	to	justify	its	proposals,	and	any	deficiencies	will	be	more	glaring	and	easier	to
detect.	The	transparency	of	legislative	justification	will	be	key	in	compelling	the	Commission	to	prove	subsidiarity
compliance.
However,	there	are	also	a	number	of	pitfalls.	The	Taskforce	conflates	subsidiarity	with	policy	substance,	arguing	that
a	‘subsidiarity	assessment	by	national	parliaments	looks	at	the	substance	of	the	Commission’s	legislative	proposals’.
Yet	parliaments	are	not	asked	to	give	their	views	on	how	EU	policies	should	be	shaped,	but	only	who	should	act	–
the	EU	or	the	Member	States.	This	denies	the	existence	of	the	main	shortcoming	of	the	early	warning	mechanism,
which	is	that	it	poses	a	rather	narrow	question.	The	problem	is	that	only	answers	to	this	question	can	create	legal
consequences	for	the	Commission,	and	even	then,	only	if	very	high	thresholds	are	met.
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The	Taskforce’s	report	is	furthermore	preoccupied	with	parliaments	expressing	their	broader	policy	concerns,
although	it	enables	this	to	be	done	within	a	section	of	the	questionnaire.	However,	the	Commission	is	free	to	ignore
such	concerns	as	they	fall	outside	the	early	warning	mechanism.	What	needed	to	be	asked	instead	is	why
parliaments	go	beyond	subsidiarity	in	the	first	place.	My	answer	is	that	this	is	because	they	are	political	institutions
and	because	their	focus	is	on	policy	preferences.	They	want	to	engage	in	politics	and	substance.	It	is	not	so	much
that	national	parliaments	lack	a	clear	approach	to	subsidiarity;	rather,	it	is	that	they	have	a	political	rather	than	a
technocratic	approach	to	it.
Containing	parliamentary	input	rather	than	promoting	it	may	prove	counterproductive	because	citizens’	disaffection
with	the	EU	is	precisely	due	to	the	depoliticisation	of	EU	policies.	The	democratic	deficit	is	not	only	about	achieving
benchmarks.	It	is	also	about	ownership	over	the	integration	project	as	a	whole,	and	a	new	bureaucratic	box-ticking
exercise	will	not	dramatically	alter	the	current	state	of	affairs.
It	is	precisely	those	reasoned	opinions	that	go	beyond	subsidiarity	that	provide	the	Commission	with	considered
policy	alternatives	and	information	on	the	anxieties	harboured	at	the	national	level.	Finding	ways	to	institutionalise
this	type	of	exchange	is	critical	to	galvanising	support	for	a	reformed	EU.
Other	Taskforce	proposals	also	paint	a	mixed	picture.	On	the	one	hand,	lowering	the	yellow	card	threshold	is
workable	and	desirable	because	it	would	put	additional	pressure	on	the	Commission	to	justify	and	rethink	its
legislative	drafts.	This	would	enrich	the	debate	on	the	evidence	and	data	that	inform	the	policies	proposed	and	thus
increase	the	legitimacy	of	the	decision-making	outcomes.
On	the	other	hand,	the	Taskforce	implicitly	rejects	the	‘green	card’	initiative,	which	aims	to	give	parliaments	a
creative	role	in	the	EU,	by	enabling	them	to	propose	the	adoption	or	removal	of	EU	legislation.	Instead,	they	are
called	upon	to	coordinate	better.	This	is	unsatisfactory	because	it	fails	to	acknowledge	yet	again	that	parliaments
wish	to	influence	the	substance	of	EU	policies.	There	already	exist	a	plethora	of	interparliamentary	conferences	that
focus	on	coordination.	It	is	time	for	engagement,	not	a	further	consignment	of	parliaments	to	the	margins	of	EU	policy
making	where	their	role	is	exhausted	once	their	action	is	merely	coordinated.
The	report	missed	an	opportunity	to	highlight	the	political	nature	of	parliamentary	contributions	to	EU	integration.	If
Brexit	has	taught	us	anything,	it	is	the	necessity	to	discuss	EU	competences	more	frequently	and	to	do	so	publicly	in
an	informed	but	indeed	partisan	way.	A	periodic	balance	of	competences	review	should	be	organised	across	the
Union	with	national	and	regional	parliaments	taking	centre	stage	in	order	to	verify	that	their	approval	of	the	Treaties
still	stands.	This	could	take	place	every	4-5	years	to	galvanise	the	public	debate.
Where	the	Taskforce	makes	the	most	innovative	contribution	is	by	calling	for	stronger	post-legislative	evaluation	of
EU	policies	in	line	with	the	Better	Regulation	Agenda.	Parliaments	have	neglected	this,	given	the	Lisbon	Treaty’s
focus	on	ex	ante	control	of	subsidiarity.	But	subsidiarity	does	not	end	at	the	input	side.	This	is	hence	emphatically	an
area	where	national	and	regional	legislatures	need	to	adapt	and	develop	adequate	institutional	resources	to	respond
to	the	needs	of	this	type	of	scrutiny.
To	conclude,	the	Taskforce	puts	forward	useful	proposals	for	a	more	streamlined	subsidiarity	monitoring	process,
which	deserve	support.	Yet	it	should	also	have	delved	into	more	complex	and	challenging	issues.	These,	regrettably,
are	solved	away	by	worn-out	calls	for	more	time,	more	information	sharing	and	better	coordination.
That	notwithstanding,	the	Taskforce’s	recognition	that	change	is	needed	is	welcome	and	will	hopefully	be	a	first	step
towards	a	deeper	reflection	on	the	options	for	democratic	reform.	The	EU	should	use	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	for	a
much	bolder	institutional	experimentation	in	an	attempt	to	fundamentally	modernise	EU	governance.	Being	a
Commission	Taskforce,	much	of	its	recommendations	seek	to	fine-tune	the	internal	workings	of	the	Commission.	Yet
a	wider,	more	visionary	approach	to	reform	would	have	been	preferable	to	politicise	the	public	discussion	on	the
future	of	the	Union.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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